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During the last few years, the amount of space debris has been frequently mentioned as a potential risk
to current and future space operations. The purpose of this article was to describe the discussions held at
the First Sustainable Space Economy Workshop held in Finland 2019. The workshop gathered together
experts with economic, legal, regulatory, technological, and environmental backgrounds, with an aim of
discussing the sustainable use of space from all these perspectives. As an outcome of these discussions,
we find that two concepts, satellite sustainability footprint and orbital capacity, should be introduced at
an international level. The satellite sustainability footprint measures how likely the satellite stays healthy
and operating, without causing risks to self or others. The orbit capacity is essentially an integral of the
footprint over an orbit, and it determines howmany satellites of different footprints could be launched to
the same orbit. In addition, in this article, we discuss how to realize such concepts within the current
normative framework. The authors suggest both top-down and bottom-up approaches, necessitating
negotiations within an intergovernmental framework and with the relevant space actors. The most
important finding of the workshop and this article, however, is that different space-related fields and
experts having diverse backgrounds should continuously discuss in a constructive and informal manner
to realize the sustainable utilization of space in practice.
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Contents
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This article conveys a summary of discussions within the First
Sustainable Space Economy Workshop held in January 2019 in
Finland. The purpose of the workshop was to focus on the issue of
space debris and to investigate the concept of “sustainability of
outer space” from different perspectives. The workshop gathered
together representatives of technical, legal, regulatory, and
economical fields. The founding idea was to begin by introducing
the understanding each discipline has on the meaning of “sus-
tainability of outer space.” After this, discussions and exchanges
were held in mixed group settings combining the approaches, with
a goal to arrive at a common understanding of the meaning of
sustainability within space activities and to define the potential
hurdles that may prevent the realization of sustainable outer space.
This article summarizes these discussions combining legal, eco-
nomic, and technological viewpoints.
With an increasing number of rocket launches, the issue of
space debris is a growing concern. Each new launch creates more
than one debris object, and the spacecraft itself eventually be-
comes a debris object, if it is not deorbited at the end of the
mission. Less than 10% of the objects launched to low-Earth orbit
(LEO) in the last 15 years have been successfully maneuvered
with the aim of removing them from their orbital regime [1].
Most LEO missions rely on decades-long natural decay to vacate
the orbital slot they have occupied. The spacecraft on the Geo-
stationary Earth Orbit (GEO) are regularly moved to a graveyard
orbit at the end of mission; however, as the objects still remain in
space, the total amount of debris is not decreased as a conse-
quence. Collisions and even missile-based explosions [2] are
increasingly contributing to the debris population growth. While
indeed the first predictions of the extent of the space debris
problem were already carried out in 1978 [3], the severity of the
situation has become more evident in recent years with the
increasing number of space objects, especially by commercial
actors. As a consequence, the LEO orbits are becoming especially
crowded [4].
Concomitantly, especially during the last decade, the issue of
sustainable use of outer space has been in the focus of attention in
various fields, but the fusion of knowledge between the fields has2
been lacking. One of the aims of the workshop was to host
transdisciplinary discussions, and to bring also economics on-
board. We find that the economic issues in relation to space sus-
tainability have so far been considered mostly from the individual
companies’ viewpoint [5] or by computing the cost of debris [6].
However, to our understanding, the field of economics in relation
to space sustainability has not received as much attention in the
current discussion. In addition, before markets for space debris
mitigation and remediation services could be established, legal
and regulatory questions should be answered, including, How to
incentivize and enforce space debris mitigation or remediation?
How to effectively monitor these actions and quantitatively assess
whether they enable sufficient use of the Earth orbits in the
future? If these measures do not suffice or do not prove to be
economically viable, how to design a regulatory system that effi-
ciently and fairly allocates usable orbital slots to current and future
missions?
The article is organized according to the flow of discussions in
the First Sustainable Space Economy Workshop. First, the article
looks at how the concept of sustainability is viewed within the
current legal framework in Section 2. Section 3 introduces how the
sustainable use of space is currently taken into account in different
space policies and national space legislation. Section 4 summarizes
what does the sustainable use of space mean in terms of safe
spaceflight and anthropogenic space object (ASO). Section 4 also
introduces, as the first outcome of the discussions held in the First
Sustainable Space Economy Workshop, a concept termed the
“satellite sustainability footprint.” Section 5 first lays general defi-
nition of the sustainability within the field of economy and then
introduces the second outcome of the workshop: the concept of
“orbit capacity” as a possible way forward to improve the current
situation. In addition to addressing the concepts of “satellite sus-
tainability footprint” and “orbit capacity,” each section is to be
considered as a standalone contribution written from the view-
point of the respective field. Section 6 makes an attempt to fuse the
fields together and ends the article with some conclusive remarks.
The purpose of the article is to initiate discussion and suggest new
research with interdisciplinary focus and inspire the community to
work further with the technical definitions relating to the issues
presented.
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2.1. Introduction
The United Nation's (UN) treaties on outer space (UN space
treaties)1 create the international legal framework for human space
activities. Although the extent of their acceptance by States varies
(as evidenced by the degree of ratification),2 the UN space treaties
form the cornerstones of international space law and the primary
international legal source for the governance of outer space activ-
ities.3 Multilateral lawmaking in the form of treaties negotiated
under the auspices of the UN has, however, for various reasons,
come to a virtual standstill after the conclusion of the Moon
Agreement. Instead, nonlegally binding instruments produced by
UNCOPUOS4 and adopted by the UNGeneral Assembly have further
developed the understanding of the space law principles.5 These,
together with other “soft law” instruments developed outside the
sphere of the UN COPUOS, have an increasingly important role in
guiding the behavior of space actors. The character of these non-
legally binding instruments is heterogeneous, and their recognition
and implementation remain voluntary.6
With the increase of nonlegally binding guidelines and standards,
there has been a significant interest by States to enact national space
laws. In addition to creating a legally binding framework for con-
ducting space activities under a national jurisdiction, national space
laws also take on a bridging role between international and domestic
laws, as well as between legal obligations and “soft law.” Norms of
nonlegally binding character can be “incorporated” in national space
laws to become legally binding and enforceable within the State's1 Treaty onPrinciplesGoverning theActivities of States in the Exploration andUse of
Outer Space, including theMoon and other Celestial Bodies, entered into force October
10, 1967: 610 UNTS 205 (Outer Space Treaty, OST); Agreement on the Rescue of As-
tronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer
Space,entered into forceDecember3,1968:672UNTS119;Conventionon International
Liability forDamageCausedbySpaceObjects, entered into forceSeptember1,1972:961
UNTS 187 (Liability Convention); Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into
Outer Space, entered into force September 15, 1976: 1023 UNTS 15; Agreement Gov-
erning theActivitiesof Stateson theMoonandOtherCelestial Bodies, entered into force
July 11, 1984: 1363 UNTS 3 (Moon Agreement).
2 For the status of State ratifications of the five UN space treaties, see UN office for
Outer Space Affairs, Status of International Agreements relating to Activities in
Outer Space https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/status/
index.html (accessed April 6, 2020).
3 The Moon Agreement has not been widely ratified, and consequently, its effects
may be considered less significant.
4 ’The Principles Resolutions: Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial
Earth Satellites for InternationalDirect TelevisionBroadcasting, UNGAResA/RES/37/92
(December 10, 1982); Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer
Space, UNGA Res A/RES/41/65 (December 3, 1986); Principles Relevant to the Use of
Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, UNGA Res A/RES/47/68 (December 14, 1992);
Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration andUse of Outer Space for
the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of
Developing Countries, UNGA Res A/RES/51/122 (December 13, 1996); The “Practice
Resolutions”: Recommendations on National Legislation Relevant to the Peaceful
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, UNGA Res A/RES/68/74 (December 11, 2013);
Application of the Concept of the “Launching State,” UNGA Res A/RES/59/115 (January
25, 2005); andRecommendations onEnhancing thePractice of States and International
IntergovernmentalOrganizations inRegisteringSpaceObjects,UNGAResA/RES/62/101
(January 10, 2008); As most recent examples the “Guidelines Resolutions” that also
relate to space sustainability: United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space,Guidelines for the long-termsustainability of outer spaceactivities, report by the
committee, annex ii, 2019. A/74/20, July 3, 2019 (LTS Guidelines); the Space Debris
Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, endorsed
by the UNGA in 2007 as an annex to the International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses
ofOuter Space,UNGAResA/RES/62/217 (December22, 2007;UNCOPUOSSpaceDebris
Mitigation Guidelines).
5 For detailed discussion of soft law in the context of space activities, see, for
example, various authors in Marboe [7], Tronchetti [8], and Freeland [9].
6 See Tapio and Soucek [10], especially in the context of space debris mitigation
Soucek and Tapio [11].
3
jurisdiction. A practical example relating to sustainability is space
debris mitigation. Although virtually all rules to reduce the prolifer-
ation of space debris are voluntary and technical in nature, many
national legislatorshave taken thoseupand turned themintobinding
licensing conditions at the national level (see a study by Tapio and
Soucek [10]). Considering that space activities by their very nature
takeplace in an area beyondnational jurisdiction,7 both international
law and national regulation, law and “soft law,” are arguably
contributing, in their own way, to the setting of common goals and
trying to ensure that they are adhered to by all space actors at large.2.2. Provisions relating to space sustainability in the UN space
treaties
The UN space treaties do not specifically address the concept of
“sustainability” as such or provide a definition of the term. Never-
theless, although sustainability is not expressly termed as such, it
would fall short of the UN space treaties' spirit to deny that they
would not include any forward-looking, environmental concern
altogether. The drive towardusability, responsible behavior, and risk
limitation in outer space activities is an important foundational
principle underlying safe and sustainable use of outer space and falls
clearly within the UN space treaties' ambit.8
Consequently, the OST does contain provisions that are relevant
and applicable to the modern international debate on space sus-
tainability and should therefore be taken into due consideration in
this discussion. For example, its Preamble refers to the “common
interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of
outer space for peaceful purposes.”9 Although the Preamble is not
legally binding, it does create certain legal effects. In addition, Article
IX of the OST establishes an obligation to avoid harmful contami-
nation of outer space, including theMoon and other celestial bodies,
and to avoid harmful interference with the activities of other
States.10 Whether such provisions are entirely utilitarian driven or7 In this context, see, for example, the topical discussion relating to the legal
aspects of (commercial) use of space resources sparked by the United States “Ex-
ecutive Order on Encouraging International Support for the Recovery and Use of
Space Resources,” issued on April 6, 2020. Available at https://www.whitehouse.
gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-encouraging-international-support-
recovery-use-space-resources/(accessed April 19, 2020), and the subsequent non-
legally binding Artemis Accords, for reference, see https://www.state.gov/dipnote-
u-s-department-of-state-official-blog/space-exploration-and-the-artemis-accords/
(accessed November 25, 2020).
8 For example, Article VI of the OST; some have concluded that “responsibility” is
a precondition to “sustainability”; for discussion on the meaning of “responsibility”,
see, for example, Rathgeber [12].
9 OST, Preamble, second substantive para.
10 OST, Article IX “In the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon
and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the
principle of cooperation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities
in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to
the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty. States Parties to
the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the Moon and other ce-
lestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful
contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting
from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt
appropriate measures for this purpose. If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to
believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space,
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful
interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and
use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, it shall undertake
appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such activity or
experiment A State Party to the Treaty, which has reason to believe that an activity
or experiment planned by another State Party in outer space, including the Moon
and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with ac-
tivities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and
other celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning the activity or
experiment.”
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concern, must be left to in-depth analysis.11 However, the UN space
treaties were drafted a decade before the advent of the notions of
“environment” and “sustainability” at the international stage, most
notably with the Stockholm Declaration of 1972.12
Moreover, Article I of the OST establishes the freedom of using
and exploring outer space, including the Moon and other celestial
bodies.13 This freedom is inherent to sustainability, and vice versa;
however, similar to other freedoms granted by the OST, it is not
absolute. The right is necessarily limited by the requirement to
afford the others the same right. Moreover, the rights are to be
interpreted in the light of the treaty's other principles, such as
cooperation and information sharing (e.g. registration),14 notions
frequently mentioned in the space sustainability debate. There is,
however, no legally binding obligations to be derived from these
rules concerning space sustainability as such. Therefore, the relation
between the freedom of exploration and the use of outer space and
themethodof orbital capacity discussed in this articlewill have to be
carefully addressed. Although the freedom of Article I of the OST is
not absolute, it cannot be restricted by some States either, not even
by the States Parties to the OST.15 Restrictions, if any, would have to
be decided on the broadest possible level “without discrimination of
any kind, on the basis of equality.”16 In the past, ideas such as
taxation or fee systems to provide for financial resources to tackle
space debris have frequently, and consistently, been challengedwith
reference to the fundamental space freedoms.
In addition, in any interpretation17 of the UN space treaties, be
that environmental or use oriented, one must take into account the
founding notions of a State's international responsibility and lia-
bility. These are especially pertinent when discussing private space
activities. Article VI of the OST sets out the basic requirement that
the States are required to oversee that the national space activities,11 For comprehensive take on the environmental issues relating to outer space
see, for example, Viikari [13] and Viikari [14].
12 United Nations General Assembly, United nations conference on the human
environment, 1972. A/RES/2994, December 15, 1972, https://www.refworld.org/
docid/3b00f1c840.html.
13 Article I of the OST “… Exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon
and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of
all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development,
and shall be the province of all mankind.”
14 See especially Articles VIII, IX, XI, and XII of the OST.
15 “It is important to note the way in which these rights are formulated in Art. I.
The rights are rights of all states, not just rights mutually recognized by the parties
of the OST and restricted to them. (…) Each state/country may explore and use
outer space.” Lyall and Larsen [15], page 60.
16 Article I of the OST.
17 As an international treaty, only its State Parties have the right to legally inter-
pret the treaty text.
18 Article VI of the OST: “States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international re-
sponsibility for national activities in outer space, including the Moon and other
celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or
by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried
out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. The activities
of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial
bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate
State Party to the Treaty. When activities are carried on in outer space, including the
Moon and other celestial bodies, by an international organization, responsibility for
compliance with this Treaty shall be borne both by the international organization
and by the States Parties to the Treaty participating in such organization.”
19 Article VII of the OST: “Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures
the launching of an object into outer space, including the Moon and other celestial
bodies, and each State Party fromwhose territory or facility an object is launched, is
internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its
natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in
air space or in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies.” The
issue of liability for damages is further elaborated and specified in the Liability
Convention.
4
including those of its nongovernmental entities, are conducted in
accordancewith international law.18 In addition, ArticleVII sets out a
related notion advocating that it is the launching State, which is
liable for damages caused by space objects.19 As such, those pro-
visions have relevance to the current discussion on the sustain-
ability of space activities, especially taking into account the novel
uses and increasing number of nongovernmental actors in outer
space. The OST requires its State parties to authorize and continu-
ously supervise the activities of nongovernmental space actors, but
it does not prescribe the form or other conditions to do so.20
As noted, in recent years, there has been an increase in the
number of national space laws.21 Concomitantly, there has been a
growing interest and need to develop the governance of space ac-
tivities through nonlegally binding instruments. Although these
two trends have emerged independently, and not necessarily as a
consequence of one and other, they are nevertheless necessarily
interlinked and together contribute to the development of space law
at large. The defining character of the nonlegally binding in-
struments is rather evidentdthey lack the enforcement mecha-
nisms available to law, while space actors due to various reasons
may follow them (includingmoral, political reasons, or self-interest
by industry), but without legal force. To achieve enforceability,
nonlegally binding instruments necessitate a deliberate change in
the character of the instrument, which can be achieved by incor-
porating these “soft law” instruments in national, legally binding
instrumentsdespecially through national space laws. Such conflu-
ence of normative spheres comes with certain challenges. Although
law has a distinct advantage in terms of steering behavior, soft law
starts from the premise that space actors voluntarily take onwhat is
established therein, and desired behavior becomes normative, and
addressed at the national level, that is, within their jurisdictional
powers (see deeper discussion in a study by Tapio and Soucek [10]).2.3. Regulating sustainable use of outer spacedthe role of
nonlegally binding instruments
In the absence of detailed and specific regulation in the UN space
treaties, the question arises,what are the best possibilities to further
develop the legal (and thus, ultimately, behavioral) framework for
space activitiesdincluding the question on space sustainability. The
most evident aspect of space sustainability and the corresponding
norms of responsible behavior in outer space, discussed and regu-
lated over the past two decades, concerns space debris mitigation.
The realization that an uncontrolled and uncoordinated increase of
the orbital debris populationwould negatively affect space activities
of all space actorsdgovernmental and private, established or
newdled to progressive regulatory action.
The first step toward behavioral management was not the cre-
ation of law; however, the issuing of the Space Debris Mitigation
Guidelines of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Com-
mittee (IADC)22 brought a nonlegally binding collection of technical
recommendationsdor guidelines, to life, which later served as the20 Article VI of the OST; it has been submitted that Article VI of the OST sets a
directive that must be achieved through “adequate means,” including, but not
necessarily confined to, legislative action at national level, Gerhard [16], page 119.
21 Especially with reference to European States, currently 12 of 22 ESA Member
States have a national space law (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, the
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Austria, the United Kingdom, Portugal,
and Greece). Many of these have been promulgated or subject to update in the
recent years.
22 The first set of guidelines were issued in 2002 and later revised in 2007; IADC is
an international forum of governmental bodies for the coordination of activities
related to the issues of man-made and natural debris in space, Foreword, IADC
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, IADC-02-01, Revision September 1, 2007.
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COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines.23 It was only with the
proliferation of modern national space laws that the obligation of
mitigation of space debris progressively found its way into binding
law. Today, many national space acts include appropriate space
debris mitigation measures as an element of the licensing re-
quirements to their nongovernmental space actors. The various
technical guidelines are thereby often incorporated by means of
(more or less specific) references in national regulation. A special
interconnection between technical norms and positive law is made
in cases where a national law refers to a nonlegally binding in-
strument as a “state of the art” requirement. The practical and legal
issues that may arise from this coupling are not always necessarily
foreseen (especially in the context of space debris mitigation, see a
study by Soucek and Tapio [11]).
As can be recalled, following a broad debate on space debris, the
overarching notion of “space sustainability” finally came under the
spotlight of intergovernmental attention when, in 2010,24 the UN
COPUOS started to deliberate on the guidelines concerning space
sustainability in a holistic manner in a multilateral setting. It trig-
gered, for the first time during the space age, a vivid exchange and
consensus building process on principles that should lead
toward more safe and sustainable use of outer space. Highlighting
the political considerations underpinning space sustainability, this
process lasted a decade and resulted in the adoption of Guidelines
for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities (LTS
Guidelines) by UN COPUOS in 2019.25
The currently agreed 21 LTS Guidelines and their preamble are
the result of widespread and multidisciplinary engagement. The
LTS Guidelines deal with various aspects relating to space
sustainability and, in this context, provide the following definition
of long-term sustainability: “the ability to maintain the conduct of
space activities indefinitely into the future in a manner that realizes
the objectives of equitable access to the benefits of the exploration
and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, in order to meet the
needs of the present generations while preserving the outer space
environment for future generations.”26 Although some of the LTS
Guidelines reflect existing legally binding norms or widespread
practice, others are more forward-looking innovations. Many
nevertheless consider that there are important areas uncovered,
most notably relating to space debris remediation and close prox-
imity operations, the inclusion of which may yet find its way once
the UN COPUOS resolves the procedural way to forward these open
issues.2723 Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Space debris mitigation
guidelines, 2007. Endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly as an annex to
the International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, December 22,
2007, UNGA Res A/RES/62/217.
24 Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Report of the scientific and
technical subcommittee on its 47th session, 2010. Vienna, February 8e19, 2010, A/
AC.105/958, paragraph 181.
25 United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Guidelines for
the long-term sustainability of outer space activities, report by the committee,
annex ii, 2019. A/74/20, July 3, 2019, http://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/
documents/2019/aac_105c_1l/aac_105c_1l_366_0_html/V1805022.pdf. The LTS
Guidelines were “welcomed with appreciation” by the UN General Assembly in the
yearly “omnibus resolution” pertaining to International Cooperation in the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space, UN General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General
Assembly on December 13, 2019, 74th session, A/A/RES/74/82.
26 LTS Guidelines, Preamble, I Context of the guidelines for the long-term sus-
tainability of outer space activities, para. 5.
27 United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Guidelines for
the long-term sustainability of outer space activities, report by the committee 2019,
especially paragraphs 165e168; These paragraphs envisage the establishment of a
dedicated working group, which is at the time of review of this article in November
2020 still in progress.
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Still, at best, the LTS Guidelines will add another element to the
plethora of “soft law” provisions that have emerged ever since
treaty making on space activities came to a standstill in the 1980s.
An international legaldthat is, enforceabledobligation to reach and
maintain orbital sustainability will therefore remain science fiction
for the near to midterm future. However, this does not mean that
law and policy could not serve to reach exactly that purpose
through other means and methods. Without entirely canceling out
the possibility of regaining the treaty-making momentum, the
nonlegally binding instruments and their application and en-
forcements through national space laws currently represent the
best way forward in safeguarding sustainable space activities.
In summary, it is noted that apart from the LTS Guidelines, the
current UN space treaties do not lay a binding, international legal
framework for the sustainable use of outer space, including the
Earth orbits. The LTS Guidelines are “soft law” and not legally
binding. It may well be questioned whether the existing “soft law”
provisions are relevant and adequate to promote sustainability and
whether national implementation of those guidelines may lead to
diverging practice among space-faring states instead of welcomed
concerted practice, especially when taking into account future
technical solutions, for example, docking. Much will depend on the
States' willingness and resources in the national implementation
process, which differs between the well-established and emerging
space-faring States.28 The current legal practice may lead to ques-
tions as to whether the route to interpret, apply, and enforce space
sustainability through national legislation is the optimal way to
solve the issue or if a binding regulation at the international level is
necessary to uniformly regulate and thus avoid local solutions to a
global problem.3. Policy perspectives of sustainable use of space
As discussed in the First Sustainable Space Economy Workshop,
several national strategies and policies recognize the need to
address and ensure the sustainable use of outer space through
space policy measures. Active updates of space policies pave the
way to further steps to ensure sustainability through national
legislation, international collaboration, technological development,
and financial instruments. In the European context, sustainable use
of outer space is currently gettingmore recognition. For example, in
2016, the European Commission adopted a Communication on a
Space Strategy for Europe,29 noting that space is becoming a more
challenging environment and recognizing the proliferation of space
debris as the most serious risk to the sustainability of space activ-
ities. Therefore, the Strategy urges to ensure the protection and
resilience of critical European space infrastructure. As an example,
the EU space surveillance and tracking (SST) support framework
responds to the issue of space debris. The proposal for regulation
establishing the EU Space Programme30 extends the SST framework
to Space Situational Awareness (SSA) to address space weather and
near-Earth objects. The Strategy also urges the Member States to
promote international principles of responsible behavior in outer
space in the framework of the United Nations and other appro-
priate multilateral fora and in line with the UN space treaties.
In the United States, a Space Policy Directive 3 (SPD-3) on Na-
tional Space Traffic Management (STM) Policy was signed on June28 For discussion on legal and regulatory aspects on the LTS Guidelines, see, for
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ronment for increasing commercial and civil space activities. An
implementing bill is under the legislative process. The aim of the
initiative is to set priorities for SSA and STM innovations and
encourage the growth of the US commercial space sector, incor-
porate national security considerations, establish an updated STM
architecture, and promote space safety standards and best practices
across the international community. The initiative considers space
safety as a global challenge and stresses the need for international
transparency and STM data sharing. As required by SPD-3, the US
National Space Council announced in December 2019 an update to
the US Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices,32
which were originally published in 2001. This update includes
improvements to the original objectives, clarification, and addi-
tional standard practices for certain classes of space operations
with the aim to promote efficient and effective space safety prac-
tices and long-term sustainability of outer space.
Space safety and security is also one of the four pillars of the
activities of the European Space Agency, with the objective to
mitigate and prevent the impact from hazards from space. At
Space19þ in 2019, ESA's Ministerial Council agreed to established
Space Safety as a new program with more than four times larger
budget than its predecessor SSA program.33,34 As a concrete action,
the ministers agreed to commission the world's first space mission
to remove an item of debris from orbit, ClearSpace-1, planned for
launch in 2025. The mission is procured as a service contract with a
startup-led commercial consortium, promoting a new market for
in-orbit servicing and debris removal.
Furthermore, smaller and younger space-faring nations, such as
Finland, Sweden, and Denmark, recognize the importance of the
sustainable use of outer space in their space policies and space
strategies. This is in accordance with economic views on how
different actors regard common-pool resources (see also Section 5).
For example, the update of the national space strategy of Finland in
November 2018 stated as one of its targets for 2025 that companies
and research organizations operating in Finland use space sus-
tainably.35 Furthermore, the Swedish Space Strategy defines the
safeguarding of the safe and predictable extraterrestrial environ-
ment as a strategic objective.36 To emphasize the importance of this
objective, Sweden aims to contribute toward common efforts to
manage the amount of space debris through international partici-
pation. Moreover, the national space strategy of Denmark recog-
nizes the opportunities provided by megaconstellations but
encourages the government to closely monitor and support inter-
national endeavors to mitigate the space debris risk likely to result
from increased activity in lower Earth orbit.37
Although international and national strategies and policies have
been made to emphasize the importance of the sustainable use of

















between policy declarations and economic interests. Promoting
opportunities of new commercial players as a strategic objective
may be more compelling than limiting those opportunities for the
sake of more sustainable use of outer space. It could even be argued
that such a conflict undermines the impact of space policies.
However, the definition of sustainability in the field of economics,
“the current use of space should not negatively affect the potential
benefits derivable from the future use of that space” (see Section 5) as
it is risking the future profits, is an important reminder empha-
sizing sustained economic benefit from space-based operations.
Therefore, the possible contradiction between the sustainability
declarations and national authorization of commercial mega-
constellations can be at least mitigated by the previously
mentioned economic definition, as it is in the interest of both
governments and operators to ensure the long-term usability of
space. Although governments may strengthen their policy state-
ments through binding regulation, self-imposed principles and
targets of companies [5] could further the sustainable space pol-
icies and provide a clear drive in space technology innovation.
Actors such as Space Safety Coalition,38 a coalition of companies
promoting responsible use of space, may become indispensable in
the future. Space policies and strategies have their role in stating
the objectives and raising awareness while concrete actions are
needed to reach those objectives.
4. Technical perspective of sustainable use of space
From a technical perspective, the discussions at the First Sus-
tainable Space Economy Workshop concluded that the practical
means to decrease the amount of debris are (1) mitigating the
creation of newdebris and (2) actively removing existing debris (for
a review see, e.g., Ref. [19]). In mitigating debris, two aspects are
important. The first aspect is to free the orbit space after the end of
themission by deorbiting the spacecraft,39 whereas the second is to
prolong the lifetime of existing spacecraft, which prevents new
debris by decreasing the need to launch more spacecraft.
4.1. Flight safety
In terms of operational flight safety, the risk aspects of space
debris to the spacecraft orbital operations can be divided into the
following subgroups:
1. Risk that the spacecraft hits another object (operational space-
craft, defunct spacecraft, or debris) and generates space debris.
2. Risk that the spacecraft, for example, due to the inability of
performing collision avoidance maneuvers, is hit by an external
object (spacecraft or debris), consequently generating space
debris.
3. Risk that the spacecraft itself generates space debris due to the
abrupt release of energy (e.g. by the explosion of propellant
tanks or batteries due to thermal runaway and catastrophic
failures of reaction wheels).
4. The risk of a collision with consequent release of debris due to
either the absence of rules or critical system failure during
collision avoidance operations.
All the previously mentioned items need to be taken into ac-
count when assessing the risk of debris generation linked to
spacecraft operations. On the first two items, the risk and the38 https://spacesafety.org.
39 Moving the spacecraft onto a graveyard orbit is not in practice an action freeing
orbital space, and it may also lead to potential future problems [20].
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capability to (1) accurately track and be aware of all relevant objects
in orbit, (2) make very accurate orbit predictions, (3) maneuver the
spacecraft, and (4) understand internationally recognized rules for
performing collision avoidance maneuvers. Furthermore, the
spacecraft's ability to withstand impact and generate as little debris
as possible (i.e. robustness) plays a role. Therefore, item (2) needs to
be addressed in the context of the spacecraft design process and is
an essential part of the preliminary design review of the spacecraft
project. The fourth item is especially relevant to safety in the
context of close proximity operations, for example, docking. Espe-
cially in the future, if in-orbit servicing will be performed to in-
crease the spacecraft lifetime, docking becomes an issue needing
international agreements.
However, the locations of the current operational spacecraft are
not always known to a great accuracy, even if it seems to be easy to
track the positions of ASO. We present a case example using
ASTRIAGraph,40 which collects position information from multiple
sources and maps their combined information into a graph data-
base. One of the issues with ASO location knowledge is that the
different sources of information about where these objects are
located are not always consistent or in agreement, indicating that
the information is to be regarded as an opinion. Fig. 1 presents an
example of the position of Flock CubeSats, owned by Planet. The
numbers 1e3 in parentheses indicate different positional infor-
mation of these CubeSats by US Space Command (USSPACECOM),
the owner (Planet), and a commercial radar operator LeoLabs,
respectively, whereas number (4) shows the position at which the
ASTRIAGraph team believes the object to be (based upon the radar
data provided by LeoLabs). The largest distances between objects
are of the order of several hundred meters. This example indicates
that, for example, for docking purposes, one needs a thorough
assessment of where the object is as well as excellent maneuver-
ability to perform a successful operation. Another immediate
problem comes from the classified spacecraft, for which the long-
term intentions and operational maneuver planning are not
shared. Currently, there is no independent, transparent measure-
ment mechanism to know the ASO positions in great detail. How-
ever, to define “space traffic management rules,” accurate
monitoring of space objects is required so that the positions can be
quantitatively assessed.
4.2. Satellite sustainability footprint
Even if the locations of the current debris and spacecraft would
be known to a great accuracy, orbit safety depends first and fore-
most on the ability of one single spacecraft to avoid loss, risk to life,
and disruption to self and others. In addition, there are uncon-
trollable factors, such as the space weather conditions, which may
lead to harm anyway. This section systematically lists the factors
discussed at the First Sustainable Space Economy Workshop,
needed to keep the spacecraft healthy in practice. The risk of
collision directly depends on these factors, and hence, they can be
used to define a “satellite sustainability footprint,” a concept from
the technical spacecraft system point of view.
4.2.1. Maneuverability
Maneuverability may mean either the capability to change the
spacecraft position to avoid collisionwith debris or the capability to
deorbit. Deorbiting of the spacecraft can be performed by the
following means: (1) gravity-assisted re-entry (with or without
drag augmentation); (2) propulsion based deorbiting (chemical,40 http://astria.tacc.utexas.edu/AstriaGraph.
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electric, or electrodynamic propulsion); and (3) active debris
removal with robotic means (if the spacecraft cannot be com-
manded to deorbit). Although the enlisted means can all be used to
deorbit, from the orbital operations for active collision avoidance
point of view, chemical or electric propulsion capability with
associated debris detection and attitude and orbit control system
capabilities are the only viable options.
The current IADC recommendation [21] is to remove spacecraft
from orbit at the latest 25 years after they have completed their
mission. This is because of the fact that spacecraft in orbits above a
certain altitude will stay in the orbit, in practice, forever unless
actively removed. The IADC recommendation was established
based on the spacecraft traffic situation at the time of the recom-
mendation. However, the situation is now changing. Klima et al.
[22] present an interesting game-theoretical consideration and
conclude that if each player removes one high-risk object every 2
years according to player's own interests, the risk of collision will
substantially decrease. This indicates that the increasing risk of
debris collisions could be mitigated by removing active satellites as
soon as they have completed their mission rather than allowing
them to stay in orbit for additional time up to 25 years. This calls for
both consideration of the 25-year rule as well as active develop-
ment of the deorbiting technologies.
4.2.2. Life expectancy
One of the most important factors affecting spacecraft health is
its ability to tolerate radiation and other environmental conditions
called space weather that permeates the near-Earth space. Radia-
tion is concentrated into two, sometimes three torus-shaped van
Allen belts [23]. Especially in the outer belt, the different energi-
zation processes contribute to highly variable fluxes of relativistic
electrons [24] that are known to cause single-event upsets and
spacecraft anomalies. Particles having higher fluxes of lower en-
ergies can cause severe damage because of spacecraft charging [25].
Furthermore, other types of unpredictable space weather can lead
to spacecraft failure [26]. LEO spacecraft traverse parts of the van
Allen belts four times an orbit, whereas the GEO spacecraft are
sometimes continuously embedded within the highly dynamic van
Allen belts.
The spacecraft life expectancy is mainly a factor of two aspects:
first, the ability to withstand the orbital conditions either by con-
struction or by fault detection and recovery, and second the ability
to prolong the spacecraft lifetime, for example, by in-orbit
servicing. The spacecraft tolerance toward space weather directly
contributes to the life expectancy of a spacecraft, and hence, one
factor contributing directly to the sustainability footprint is how
long the spacecraft is expected to be healthy to operate and to
receive commands within the targeted orbit. A critical factor in the
life expectancy is to pass the various tests before the launch and to
use components that are known to operate in different orbital
conditions. Spacecraft can also be built in such a way that it detects
faults and recovers from, for example, radiation-based failures [27].
Life expectancy could also be prolonged by in-orbit servicing, for
example, by performing refueling, repairing, upgrading, trans-
porting, and rescuing. Therefore, the ability to dock an in-orbit
servicing vehicle would favorably contribute to the life expec-
tancy, assuming that the docking itself does not cause harm. So far,
such missions have not been carried out autonomously [28].
4.2.3. Radio frequency interference
Although the spacecraft itself could be healthy and operating
in orbit, it cannot be command or it cannot send signals to
ground makes it effectively a piece of debris. Conditions leading
to this situation could be caused by radio frequency interference
(RFI), which can occur unintentionally due to space weather
Fig. 1. Case example by ASTRIAGraph. The orange line represents an orbit of an ASO, and the numbers 1e3 indicate the position location for the object based on USSTRATCOM (1),
object owner Planet (2), a commercial radar operator LeoLabs (3), respectively. Number (4) indicates the position at which the ASTRIAGraph team believes the object to be, based
upon the radar data provided by LeoLabs.
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intentional jamming of the spacecraft signals. In fact, RFI can be
considered as a major cybersecurity threat to satellite
operations and is therefore a major concern in the sustainable
use of space [31]. Currently, the radio spectrum framework is
being managed and regulated by the International Telecommu-
nication Union (ITU).
4.2.4. Reliability of the design, launch, and operations
Other factors that directly contribute to the spacecraft health
and therefore the sustainability footprint are as follows:
 Reliability of launch. If everything else in the spacecraft tech-
nical design and operation passes the sustainability criteria but
the launch fails, especially near the targeted orbit, the spacecraft
may remain as piece of debris.
 Predictability of behavior on orbit. This factor is dependent both
on the spacecraft construction and its structural integrity, as
well as its software and communication with the ground.
Robustness in the predictability of behavior is mainly achieved
before launch, while environmental contributions, such as space
weather, may contribute as well. It is important to identify
whether the spacecraft operations are nearing the end of life,
indicating that the spacecraft should be commanded to free the
allocated orbit space while it is still in good health to do so.
 Size. Large objects are more threatening to the other users of
space, and if they collide or break up, others will have a larger
debris cloud to handle.4.2.5. Similar efforts
Before January 2019, concepts close to the satellite sustainability
footprint have been promoted by Oltrogge [32] in the 2018
SpaceOps Conference and by Khlystov [33] in 69th International
Astronautical Congress held in Bremen 2018. In May 2019, the
World Economic Forum announced a team41 developing a Space41 https://www.media.mit.edu/posts/creating-a-space-sustainability-rating/.
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Sustainability Rating,42 which is a score representing a mission's
sustainability in relation to international guidelines. It is based on
voluntary answers to a questionnaire and promises to evaluate the
answers “in combination with other external data through a
mathematical model that establishes a rating for the mission.” The
concept is introduced in Rathnasabapathy et al. [34]. This rating
concept is applied for the space environment capacity control by
Krag et al. [35]. Furthermore, a similar concept, named Space Traffic
Footprint, has been introduced at the UN COPUOS meeting in
February 2019 [36].
4.3. Quantifying the satellite sustainability footprint
We noted in the First Sustainable Space Economy Workshop
that to succeed in establishing a sustainability footprint definition
respected by all space-faring parties, all opinions should be heard in
building the footprint; otherwise, it will not be widely respected.
Therefore, we do not arrive at a quantitative definition here but
merely propose that one should be developed at a suitable inter-
national arena trusted by all parties. However, we note that the
loose understanding of the footprint is the burden that any given
ASO poses on the safety and sustainability of any other ASO and the
environment. Aminimal satellite sustainability footprint allows self
and others to use space safely without risking anyone's operations,
whereas a maximal footprint completely prevents self and others
from using the specific orbital space. Minimizing the footprint
means that the spacecraft itself and its operations must be per-
formed such that degradation or disruption of services is pre-
vented. Even with a minimum footprint, however, other users of
space must take it into account for their own safety, and therefore,
the risk to others is not negligible. Maximum footprint could be
associated to a spacecraft, which breaks up because of any of the
reasons mentioned previously.
A possible framework to assess the satellite sustainability foot-
print is the Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) tool, which is used to
qualify environmental impacts of the spacecraft production and42 https://www.weforum.org/projects/space-sustainability-rating.
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tempts to introduce space debris indicators into LCA are currently
being carried out byMaury et al. [37], who consider the exposure to
space debris and the severity of a potential spacecraft break up to
the orbit environment. The satellite sustainability footprint could
be a parameter to which all previously mentioned factors
contribute, and in practice, it could be an eco-label, agreed by all
parties. Furthermore, the satellite sustainability footprint could also
include various other environmental perspectives, for example, a
carbon footprint per unit of service delivery. Developing foot-
printing methodologies for satellites could be built on exist-
ingdLCA baseddapproaches for product carbon footprints [38]. A
particular challenge is the sharing of information necessary to
calculate (and verify) the footprint, for which, among others,
blockchain technologies could be used [39]. A quantified satellite
footprint creates a measurable concept, which can be used in pol-
icies to enhance the sustainable use of space.
5. Economic perspective of sustainable use of space
Our discussions from the perspective of the field of economics at
the First Sustainable Space Economy Workshop started from the
definition of sustainability. As previously stated, the definition for
the sustainable use of space is that the current use of space should
not negatively affect the future use of that space. The economic
framework for a finite natural or man-made resource is called
common-pool resource [40,41]. In conjunction with the economic
definition of sustainable use of space, a concept called external ef-
fects is important. A negative external effect means that the
considered phenomenon, that is, space debris, causes negative ef-
fects on other parties inside or outside the considered system or
domain, without compensating the affected parties for these
negative effects. For example, debris collisions can harm other
satellites, whereas, on the other hand, the debris risk may prevent
newly planned satellites to obtain the preferred orbit or to com-
plete their mission, or even reach any orbit at all.
Recently, a few authors [42e44] have started to study the space
debris issue casting it as an economic problem of sustainable
management of a common-pool resource. Furthermore, efforts
based on the choices of individual companies have been intro-
duced, for example, Chrysaki [5] calls for a voluntary code of
conduct to be adopted by private companies and industries, with
the idea that responsible behavior would increase the company
brand, reputation, and ethical investments. The Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has recently
assessed the socioeconomic impacts and costs related to space
debris [6]. The OECD report [6] concludes that, for example, at GEO,
the debris mitigation costs can be 5e10% of the mission costs and
even higher at LEO. Furthermore, they call for research into deor-
biting and space weather while requesting internationally binding
minimum requirements to be developed.
5.1. Defining orbit capacity
The rationale for an economic intervention regarding the use of
orbits is that the total capacity of orbits is large but nevertheless
finite. In economic terms, the definition of capacity can be either
based on physical properties (orbits, satellites, and already present
debris) or on the aspired aggregate service output and net benefit
capacity from those orbits. STM rules have to be based on the
physical orbital capacity; however, if value maximization of total
orbit endowment is the target, the service capacity needs to be
taken into account. If there is no concertation or coordination of
individual decision-making, according to economic theory, each
actor will try to maximize its total net benefits, which often results9
in a process, eventually leading to exhaustion of the resource ca-
pacity and thereby causing a rise of costs and/or a decrease in
benefits (service output). If there is concertation of the actors’ de-
cisions, it is in principle possible to attain a maximum level of
common-pool resource use, which is still sustainable, thereby
maximizing aggregate benefits over a longer period. The switch
from individualized to concerted decision-making faces often a
social dilemma, as some of the actors will lose compared with a
situation without concertation.
The economic approach to orbit capacity offers promising po-
tential for specifying sustainable management of orbital use. It is
generally known that management of common-pool resources re-
quires cooperationwithin sectors and/or regions [40]. The stronger,
broader, and clearer the consensus is, the better it guides decision-
making in the entire value chain. The satellite sustainability foot-
print could define the constraints one must take into account in
determining capacity so that responsible management of the
footprint factors (maneuverability, life expectancy, etc.) all act to
decrease the satellite sustainability footprint, indicating that a large
number of such spacecraft could be allocated into the same orbit. If
the footprint factors are not well managed, and, for example, the
spacecraft can turn into a defunct object that cannot be operated by
ground commands, this would result in increasing the footprint,
and fewer of those spacecraft could be allocated to the same orbit.
Under certain market conditions, it can be attractive for incumbent
(market dominant) satellite companies not to vacate an orbit
despite the dysfunction of the satellite [42]. This is relevant if the
consequent reduction in available orbit space causes satellite ser-
vice prices to rise, which more than compensates for the foregone
revenues of an unused satellite slot plus the remaining cost of
keeping the dysfunctional satellite.
Quantification of (remaining) orbit space could be envisaged
starting from defining the amount of debris, which is still accept-
able, for example, to avoid the Kessler syndrome, which predicts a
cascade of collisions leading to exponential increase of objects. In
this respect, the 850 km sun-synchronous LEO orbit may be nearing
its maximum capacity, as the estimated number of potentially fatal
debris objects is already around 9000 [45]. The maximum capacity
could be understood as the maximum tolerable risk per orbit so
that the consequences to other users are minimized. This minimi-
zation can be viewed as taking into account the negative effect
within the economic theory. The incremental additions to the orbit
capacity could be reflected in terms of pathways reaching the in-
flection point of the Kessler syndrome.5.2. Allocation under common-pool resource conditions
From an economic perspective, capacity management can be
reflected from two viewpoints: (1) operational capacity
management and (2) capacity management within the common
pool of resources. Operational capacity management [46] is a task
of understanding the constraints of different resources used by the
operations. In addition, it is about setting and agreeing the effective
capacity of any operations in a way it can respond to the demand
requirements placed upon it. Capacity management is typically
divided into three time-based planning horizons (short-, medium-,
and long-term capacity management). Furthermore, capacity
management can be based on different degrees of commonality
[32]. Typically, the capacity is being planned and managed in
aggregated terms. Capacity management can be executed by using
cumulative representations and/or queuing theory. Almost all op-
erations have different kinds of fluctuations in forecast and oper-
ating demand causing changes in capacity management and
decisions over time.
43 That is, that space debris causes negative effects on other parties without
compensating the affected parties.
44 Practically, all countries in the world have ratified the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (effectively in force since 1989). The
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character of orbits, they can consider capacity management [47]:
(1) pre-determination of (maximum) aggregated capacity levels
and (2) potential (future) incremental additions to predetermined
capacity and their decisions points in time. The new time horizons
for decisions of incremental capacity is important because typically,
the different constraints using the capacities of common-pool re-
sources are known. Ill-structured and inadequate rights, regulatory
structures, regional specificities, and other externalities all increase
the complexity of capacity management issues among actors that
utilize the common-pool resources.
The sustainable management of the orbits as a common-pool
resource can take several forms. Yet, all these forms need a
consensus on cooperation as a basic prerequisite of the feasibility
and acceptability of the management approach. On the one hand,
there are price-based approaches that filter out demand for orbit
space such that the most valuable satellites get suitable orbits
allocated [43,44]. On the other hand, the benefits of science satel-
lites or services for countries with different per capita wealth levels
could be treated by a weighing scheme to make these benefits
comparable, but the choice of the weighing system itself would
need to be embedded in a discourse and open decision process.
Another approach is to arrive at a commonly accepted set of allo-
cation rules while accounting for the societal value of satellite basis
services, equity effects of allocation, some minimum amount of
new entrants and/or avoidance of market power, piloting in-
novations, etc., following the Institutional Analysis and Develop-
ment (IAD) framework introduced by Ostrom et al. [40]. The IAD
approach does include quantitative assessment but allows room for
negotiation and consensus as well, largely meaning that at the
expense of some degree of optimality, the actual feasibility and
acceptability of the management scheme are improved.
Responding to the new demands, as determined by the eco-
nomic theory mentioned earlier, would lead to decisions whether
or not more spacecraft can be launched to a specific orbit that has a
certain footprint. The admission of new launches can be handled
through decision protocols, such as can be developed in the IAD
approach. Queuing theory in space would mean that no more
spacecraft can be launched to a specific orbit before some capacity
on that orbit is freed, whereas freeing up orbit space can be
addressed with technical removal initiatives. The interesting (and
quite possibly the most difficult) decisions concern the determi-
nation of maximum capacity and how and when the orbital space
can be incrementally occupied when the orbital capacity is reach-
ing its maximum. In practice, it will be unlikely that themajor space
powers will adopt the concept of orbital capacity, especially if na-
tional security is at stake.
A recent article by Letizia et al. [48] also discusses the concept of
orbital capacity with ample amount of figures and illustrations.
They propose to use a debris index [49,50] as the measure for
allocation of the orbital capacity and note that a register should be
compiled, including log entries of upcoming missions by different
operators. The log entry should also declare the reliability measure
for the mission, serving to quantify the allocation of the capacity.
Letizia et al. [48] envisage that the registration process could be
carried out similarly as the ITU registration takes place, and the
registry should be routinely updated to take into account the cur-
rent situation of the targeted orbit. They also envisage a definition
of a priority criterion in allocation of the orbits to prevent com-
mercial missions from blocking scientific ones and call for equality
between operators.105.3. General principles
From the perspective of the economic theory, the key elements
of managing the sustainable use of space are as follows:
1. Acknowledging the applicability of the economic sustainability
principle and agreeing on its defining features (e.g. maximizing
the number of properly functioning satellites per orbit, that is,
the orbit capacity, over a larger timeframe);
2. Acknowledging the external effects43 of space debris and
agreeing on its defining features, such as the space debris gen-
eration capacity of satellites, and the effects of increments in
volume and composition of space debris on the decrease in
utilizable orbit space and the types of harm done to other
satellites;
3. Operationalizing sustainable orbit space by quantifying the
maximum allowable numbers of functioning satellites per
period according to different technical property composites
(lifetime, debris potential, etc.)
4. Operationalizing external effects, that is, assessing the costs of
debris caused by orbital space limits and of collision damage
with functioning satellites.
As regards governance of common-pool resources, the economics
literature offers various examples such as the Montreal Protocol44
on the global phasing out of ozone layer depleting substances as
well as bottom-up designs proposed by Ostrom et al. [40] and
Ostrom [41]. However, the first step, acknowledging the applica-
bility of the sustainability principle and its defining features, is of
paramount importance to get any kind of sustainable space man-
agement system in place. Such acknowledgment processes usually
take considerable time. For example, the International Committee
for the Protection of the Rhine,45 involving policies with binding
elements, was established in 1950, but effective policies only star-
ted to emerge in the 70s and even more so in the 80s of the pre-
vious century.6. Concluding remarks
This article summarized the discussions at the First Sustainable
EconomyWorkshop in January 2019, looking at the sustainable use
of space from technological, legal, and economic perspectives. Two
concepts, in particular, emerged in the discussion during the
workshop, namely, satellite sustainability footprint and orbit capac-
ity. These concepts, as noted, are already being developed by
several actors. Work toward defining the concepts at an academic
level in openly available peer-reviewed literature is a step forward
in describing the situation on each orbit transparently and more
accurately. An altogether different question is how to fit these
concepts into the existing legal and regulatory framework, which
would require agreement on how to manage orbital capacity, and
its consequences in a transparent, trustworthy, and neutral manner.
A third metric is also illustrated in this context, an aggregate global
benefit that is obtainable from alternative satellite compositions
resulting fromdifferent orbit allocation rules. It is unlikely that suchTreaty aims to get halogenated hydrocarbons (notably CFC's) replaced by other
substances or other technologies altogether and is regarded as a successful treaty
with a high degree of compliance. See https://ozone.unep.org/treaties/montreal-
protocol.
45 https://www.iksr.org/en/.
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political and legal reasons, aside from practical and conceptual
uncertainties. Instead, a quantitatively supported negotiation pro-
cess with commonly agreed criteria may be more likely to yield
effects.
To further discuss the evolution of regimes pertaining to
orbit utilization, it is relevant to evaluate the differences be-
tween regulatory (i.e. top-down) approaches and nonbinding,
“self-organizing” (i.e. bottom-up) processes, both of which
could contribute to furthering the sustainable use of space. A
top-down process could mean an intergovernmental or na-
tional legislative approach aiming at developing a regulatory
framework, including defined rights and obligations, limita-
tions, supervision, and possibly enforcement and arbitrage. In
contrast, a bottom-up, “self-organization” could be led by in-
dustry, technical experts, or standardization groups on a
voluntary basis. Examples of such bottom-up processes are the
ongoing process for on-orbit servicing standards and the Space
Sustainability Rating by the World Economic Forum together
with ESA and other actors. A caveat in the bottom-up approach
is that the voluntary nature of its products requires indepen-
dent, neutral, and transparent verification mechanisms which
all parties trust, and thereby again, possibly, requiring top-
down efforts. The rationale of both processes is driven by the
need to provide practical solutions and, at the same time, the
desire to generate certain benefits, whereby the ultimate
motivation and rationale might differ depending on the process
and its context.
In addition, an idea for a bottom-up approach based on sus-
tainability market opportunities is also introduced in this
context. It is not meant that markets should drive the sustainable
use, rather that sustainable use enables new markets. The climate
crisis has created a drive toward green energy and new market
opportunities, for example, for wind and solar energy, which are
both a market opportunity and a sustainability action. Similar
opportunities could be envisaged around three space-related
concepts: (1) mitigation of debris (e.g. preventing debris by
deorbiting), (2) on-orbit servicing, and (3) active debris removal,
which all contribute to, and support, sustainability. All three
represent an economical opportunity: for example, a commercial
upstream company may be interested in keeping its allocated
orbit free of debris to safeguard its investment, creating a market
opportunity for active debris removal. Furthermore, in-orbit
servicing capabilities such as refueling will increase a satellite's
lifetime, which can be reflected as savings, that is, the saving of a
replacement spacecraft. Possible rules for clearing the orbit space
after a mission creates a market opportunity for developing
deorbiting devices.
In summary, this article conveys the discussions held at the First
Sustainable Space Economy Workshop held on January 23e25,
2019, in Espoo, Finland. We note that more information sharing
between different space actors is required to improve the long-
term sustainability of orbital space. Discussions both at the top
level and among grass-root level actors are needed. All in all, sus-
tainable space is not a local or regional, but a global issue, calling for
versatile transdisciplinary interactions. We intend to host such
discussions in the future as a continuation to the successful first
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